














This paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the
inequality of nations. The world economy consists of inherently identical
countries, which could differ only in their levels of capital stock. Each country is
represented by the standard overlapping generations model, modified only to
incorporate credit market imperfection.  An integration of financial markets
affects the set of stable steady states, as it changes the balance between the
equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force
of the wealth-dependent borrowing constraint.  The model is simple and tractable
enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states.
In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy
has a unique stable steady state, which is symmetric.  When the international
financial market is introduced, symmetry-breaking occurs under some conditions.
That is to say, the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric
steady states come to exist.  In the stable asymmetric steady states, the world
economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries; the borrowing
constraints are binding in the poor countries but not in the rich countries; the
world output is smaller, the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the
stable asymmetric steady states than in the (unstable) symmetric steady state.
JEL classification numbers: E44 (Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy), F43
(Economic Growth of Open Economies), O11 (Macroeconomic Analyses of
Economic Development)
Keywords: diminishing returns, wealth-dependent borrowing-constraints,
symmetry-breaking, structualism
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1. Introduction
What are the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations?  The
conventional wisdom suggests that an integration of national financial markets facilitates
financial flows from rich countries to poor countries, thereby accelerating development in poor
countries. According to this view, financial market globalization helps to reduce the inequality of
nations.  There is, however, the widely held belief that poor countries are unable to compete in
the integrated financial market against rich countries, which can offer financial security to the
lenders in the imperfect world.  According to this view, whose intellectual origin can be traced
back to structuralism of Nurkse (1953), Myrdal (1957) and Lewis (1977), financial market
globalization magnifies the inequality. The structualists often advocate that the poor countries
should impose capital controls to stem the outflows of the domestic saving and that official aids
from rich countries are needed for the development of poor countries. Some express an even
more radical view that the poor countries should jointly cut their links to the rich countries and
unite among themselves to escape the poverty. It is difficult to evaluate the logical consistency of
their argument, because there have been few attempts to formalize it. The lack of formality not
only renders their argument subject to various interpretations, but also leads many mainstream
economists to dismiss it as a mere rhetoric or muddled thinking.
2  The structualists, on their part,
dismiss the standard economic theory, used by mainstream economists to illustrate the
conventional wisdom, as irrelevant, because they believe it fails to capture the complex reality of
the imperfect world.
3  In short, the two camps seem unable to communicate with each other.
4
In the present paper, we take a small step toward reconciling these two conflicting views.
To this end, we develop a framework within which to investigate the effect of financial market
globalization on the inequality of nations in the presence of credit market imperfection.  The
world economy is made up of inherently identical countries that differ only in their initial levels
of capital stock. Each country is represented by the Diamond overlapping generations model,
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modified to incorporate a credit market imperfection.  The model is set up in such a way that, in
the absence of credit market imperfection, the only stable steady state is symmetric, both with
and without the integration. The two key elements of this framework are the diminishing returns
technology and endogenous borrowing constraints. The former makes the marginal productivity
of investment higher in poor countries, which creates an equalizing force. The latter makes the
domestic investment dependent upon the domestic wealth, which in turn depends on the
domestic investment. This creates an unequalizing force. Financial market globalization affects
the structure of stable steady states of the world economy, as it changes the balance between
these two competing forces.
In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy has the unique
steady state, which is symmetric and globally stable (in spite of credit market imperfection). This
is because, with no international lending and borrowing, capital formation in each country is
dictated entirely by the domestic saving, and each country reaches the same steady state. The
symmetric steady state is stable, because the domestic interest rate adjusts independently within
each country to equate the domestic saving and the domestic investment, when different
countries are hit by different shocks.
When the international financial market is introduced, symmetry-breaking occurs under
some conditions.
5  That is to say, the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable
asymmetric steady states come to exist.  The symmetric steady state is unstable because, with the
integration of the financial markets, the interest rates in different countries must move together.
Without offsetting changes in the domestic interest rates, the agents in the countries hit by
relatively bad shocks are put in disadvantage, and the domestic investment in these countries
decline, creating a downward spiral of low-wealth/low-investment.  The same force operates in
the opposite direction within the countries hit by relatively good shocks, creating an upward
spiral of high-wealth/high-investment.  In the stable asymmetric steady states, the world economy
is polarized into the rich and the poor and the borrowing constraint is binding in the poor
countries, but not in the rich countries. Furthermore, the rich are richer and the poor are poorer
and the world output is smaller than in the (unstable) symmetric steady state. Therefore, the
                                                                       
5Symmetry-breaking has found a wide range of applications in natural sciences.  See Matsuyama (1995, 2002a) for
its logic and its applications in economics.3
symmetry-breaking case offers some support for the structualist view that globalization magnifies
the inequality of nations, as well as for the popular belief that global capitalism is a mechanism
through which some countries become rich at the expense of others. Contrary to the popular
belief, however, the model suggests that the poor countries cannot jointly escape from the
poverty by cutting their links to the rich countries and that official aids from the rich would not
eliminate the inequality. Just as in a game of musical chairs, some countries have to be excluded
from being rich.
Demonstrating the possibility that globalization might cause symmetry-breaking is
important, because it captures the structualist view and hence enables us to put their argument
under logical scrutiny.  What is equally important is that globalization does not always cause
symmetry-breaking.  The major advantage of the present framework is that it is simple and
tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states in the world
economy, which enables us to express analytically both the sufficient and necessary condition for
the symmetry-breaking case.  (Roughly speaking, for a sufficiently large credit market
imperfection, symmetry-breaking occurs when the productivity of the investment projects is
neither too high nor too low.)  The present model thus serves as an organizing framework for
understanding and reconciling the two conflicting views of the world.
As the title suggests, this paper offers a theory of endogenous inequality of nations; it
examines how financial market globalization might cause a change in the endogenous
components of heterogeneities across countries.  Needless to say, there are obvious sources of
exogenous heterogeneities across countries, e.g., the climate, the natural endowments, the
location, etc.  The logic of symmetry-breaking does not suggest that such exogenous
heterogeneities are unimportant.  On the contrary, symmetry-breaking is a magnification
mechanism.  It suggests that even a small amount of exogenous heterogeneities can be amplified
to create large observed heterogeneities in a variety of endogenous variables.
6
As a theory of endogenous inequality of nations, the present model is designed to
highlight a mechanism that magnifies cross-country differences, not only in per capita income but
also in other variables.  As such, this paper differs fundamentally, both in its objective and in its
methodology, from the voluminous literature, which includes Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
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Parente and Prescott (1994) and Klenow and Rodríguez (1997), just to name a few.  This body of
work has developed mostly as the contest between the neoclassical versus endogenous growth
models in their ability to fit the cross-country data.  It seeks to account for the cross-country
differences in per capita income in terms of the cross-country differences in other variables, such
as investment rates, market distortions, government policies, and political institutions, etc, under
the following three (often unstated) maintained hypotheses.  First, individual countries are closed
economies, and their data provide independent observations of the underlying processes.
Second, the cross-country variations in these “explanatory” variables are assumed to be
exogenous and left unexplained.  In particular, it is assumed that they are not caused by
differences in the income levels.  Third, any cross-country variations would disappear without
cross-country variations in these exogenous “explanatory” variables.  That is, no endogenous
inequality is one of their identifying assumptions.  Because of the first maintained hypothesis,
this body of work has nothing to say about how financial market globalization might change the
inequality of nations.  The second maintained hypothesis makes this body of work unable to
capture the structualist view that low investment rates, high market distortions and other
common features of poor countries are symptoms of the poverty, rather than the causes of the
poverty.  Because of the third maintained hypothesis, this body of work does not offer a theory of
endogenous inequality.  It is worth pointing out that the model developed below predicts, in the
symmetry-breaking case, that the poor countries suffer from low investments and the borrowing
constraints, but not the rich countries.  One should not conclude from this that the investment
distortions “explain” the poverty of nations, because the causality goes in both directions.  Both
the income levels and the investment distortions are endogenous. The very fact that, even in such
a highly stylized model, an integration of national financial markets generates endogenous
variations not only in income but also in other variables across inherently identical countries
should at least give the reader a warning when interpreting the results obtained in this literature.
As a theory of endogenous inequality of nations, the symmetry-breaking approach may be
contrasted with an alternative, which may be called the “poverty trap” or “coordination failure”
approach.
7  Take any model of poverty traps that analyzes a country in isolation, either as a
closed economy or as a small open economy, such as Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989),
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Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Matsuyama (1991), Ljungqvist (1993), Ciccone and Matsuyama
(1996), and Rodríguez (1996).  These models have multiple equilibria (in static models) or
multiple steady states (in dynamic models).  Then, one could argue that, even in the world
economy made up of inherently identical countries, it is possible that some countries remain poor
while others are rich, simply because different equilibria (or steady states) prevail in different
countries.  In other words, some countries are in poverty traps, while others are not.  Although
the poverty trap approach suggests the possibility of co-existence of the rich and the poor, it does
not suggest that such co-existence is the only stable patterns.  The symmetric patterns are also
stable.  Without the broken symmetry, this approach does not capture the structualist view that
the division of the world economy into the rich and the poor is an inevitable feature of the
International Economic Order or of the Modern World System.  Furthermore, it cannot yield any
definite prediction regarding the effects of financial market globalization on the degree of the
inequality.  Moreover, the two approaches have different policy implications.  According to the
poverty trap approach, the case of underdevelopment is an isolated problem, which can be treated
independently for each country.  According to the symmetry-breaking approach, it is a part of the
interrelated whole, and needs to be dealt with at the global level, which is more in the spirit of
structualism.
Before proceeding, a couple of cautions should be given to the reader.  First, the case of
symmetry-breaking should not be confused with the case of divergence in the long run evolution
of the world income distribution.  As a thought experiment in section 6.4 suggests, the
symmetry-breaking case is consistent with the convergence hypothesis.  The symmetry-breaking
case suggests that there is a limit to convergence, but does not necessarily imply that the cross-
country difference would widen over time.  Second, this paper does not attempt to explain the
patterns of capital flows.  The following analysis focuses on the characterization of the steady
states. By definition, net capital flows are equal to zero in any steady state.  The model thus
suggests, in the case of symmetry-breaking, a possible explanation for why (financial) capital
doesn’t flow from rich to poor countries.
8  Nevertheless, a satisfactory treatment of this issue
would require an explicit analysis of the dynamic paths in an extension of this model that would
incorporate country-specific shocks, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses more directly related
work in the literature.  Section 3 develops the building blocks of the model.  Sections 4 and 5
provide the analysis for the autarky and small open economy cases, which serve as preliminary
steps for the analysis of the world economy in Section 6.  Section 7 discusses how robust the
results are when different specifications are used. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related Work in the Literature
This paper focuses on credit market imperfection and the wealth-dependent borrowing
constraint as the key mechanism behind symmetry-breaking. This is just one of many
mechanisms through which structuralists believe that globalization magnifies the inequality of
nations.  Indeed, previous studies have focused on a different symmetry-breaking mechanism to
capture the structuralist view.  In Krugman (1981), Krugman and Venables (1995), and
Matsuyama (1996), an integration of goods markets can lead to symmetry-breaking, dividing
inherently identical countries into the rich and the poor. The possibility that an integration of
factor markets can lead to symmetry-breaking has also been extensively studied, although they
are usually discussed in the context of regional integration within countries. The symmetry-
breaking mechanism in all these studies is aggregate increasing returns, which create
agglomeration economies. If this is the mechanism behind symmetry-breaking in the world
economy, there are some efficiency gains from symmetry-breaking and the world as a whole may
benefit from globalization and magnifying inequality. Even the countries that become poorer than
others may gain from globalization.  Furthermore, the effect would not depend on the form of
globalization. Whether it takes place in financial markets, in factor markets, or in goods markets,
globalization makes symmetry-breaking more likely in the presence of agglomeration economies.
In the present paper, the technology satisfies diminishing returns at the aggregate level, so that
symmetry-breaking generates efficiency losses.  Thus, globalization makes some countries richer
only at the expense of making the rest of the world poorer.  Furthermore, the effect depends
critically on the form of globalization.  Financial market globalization (trade in financial assets)
makes symmetry-breaking more likely, while factor market globalization (such as foreign direct
investment and trade in physical capital, i.e., the capital good used in production) would make
symmetry-breaking less likely.7
Many recent studies have examined the role of the international financial market in the
presence of credit market imperfection: see, for example, the work cited by Obstfeld (1998) and
Tirole (2002a).  They mostly focus on the issue of short-run volatility, motivated by recent
economic crises in emerging markets. Only a few studies have addressed the effects of financial
market globalization on the inequality of nations in the presence of credit market imperfection.
In the static model of Gertler and Rogoff (1990), the country’s wealth is given by an exogenous
endowment.  They examined how the distribution of the endowment across countries affects the
investment and financial capital flows, but, due to the static nature of the model, there is no
feedback effect from the investment to the distribution. Boyd and Smith (1997) introduced such
feedback effect in an overlapping generations model of the world economy.  Their model is so
complicated that they had to assume that the borrowing constraint is always binding for all the
countries, both in and out of the steady states, and even then, they had to rely on the numerical
simulation to prove the stability of asymmetric steady states.  They also restricted their
parameters in such a way the symmetric steady state is always unstable. The model presented in
this paper has advantage of being tractable, which makes it possible to characterize all the stable
steady states for the full set of the parameter values, without making any auxiliary assumption.
9
In other words, the present model allows one to derive analytically the conditions for the stability
of the symmetric and asymmetric steady states and for the borrowing constraint to be binding in
these steady states.  This in turn makes it possible to examine the effects of changing the
parameter values, making the model useful as an intuition-building device.
10
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The analysis shows that the borrowing constraint is not binding for the rich in all the stable asymmetric steady states,
which necessarily exist when the symmetric steady state is unstable.
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and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), and Matsuyama (2000) and Mookherjee and Ray (2000).  The last
two studies in particular use the symmetry-breaking approach to explain endogenous inequality across households.
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assumption that each household faces a nonconvex technology plays an essential role in generating the inequality
among households.  In the present model, the inequality among nations is generated despite that each nation has a
convex technology.  Second, inequality is transmitted over time through bequest motives in these studies.  Here, they
are transmitted through nontraded factor markets that generate a home bias in the investment demand spillovers.
These differences in the specifications lead to the difference in the predictions, as well.  For example, in the model of
Matsuyama (2000), which uses the same specification of the credit market imperfection with the present model,
endogenous inequality across households occurs when the productivity of the investment projects is sufficiently low.
In the present model, endogenous inequality across nations occurs when the productivity of the investment projects is
neither too low nor too high.8
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997, Section VI) and Martin and Rey (2001) demonstrated how
incomplete markets (in the sense of Arrow-Debreu securities) could magnify the inequality of
nations. The key mechanism in these models is that rich countries have better financial markets
than poor countries, which provide with more opportunities to diversify, and hence encourage
more investment. In other words, the agents in poor countries do not enjoy the equal access to the
financial markets as those in rich countries.  In the present paper, as well as in the models of
Gertler-Rogoff-Boyd-Smith, it is assumed that countries do not differ in their degree of credit
market imperfection. The key mechanism here is that globalization makes everyone have the
equal access to the financial markets, thereby forcing the agents in the poor countries, who have
less wealth, to compete directly with those in the rich countries for the credit.
11
3. The Model
The basic framework used is the Diamond overlapping generations with two period
lifetimes.  A single final good is produced by two factors of production: labor, supplied by the
young agents, and physical capital, supplied by the old agents.  “Labor” should be interpreted
broadly to include any endowment held by the young agents, whose equilibrium value increases
with the investment made by the older generation.  “Physical capital” should be interpreted
broadly to include human capital or any capital good used in production.  The final good
produced in period t may be consumed in period t or may be invested in the production of
physical capital, which become available in period t+1. When physical capital is interpreted as
human capital, this technology may be interpreted as education.  Only the final good can be
traded (intertemporally) between countries. Both factors of production are assumed nontradeable.
The technology of the final goods sector satisfies standard, neoclassical properties.  It is
given by a linear homogeneous production function, Yt = F(Kt,Lt), where Kt and Lt are aggregate
domestic supplies of physical capital and labor in period t.  Let yt Yt/Lt = F(Kt/Lt,1)  f(kt)
where kt  Kt/Lt  and f(k) is C
2 and satisfies f(k) > 0 > f(k), f(0) = 0, and f(0) = .  The factor
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markets are competitive, and the factor rewards for physical capital and for labor are equal to t =
f(kt) and wt = f(kt)  ktf(kt)  W(kt), which are both paid in the final good.  Note that f(k) < 0
implies that a higher in kt increases wt and reduces t.  For simplicity, physical capital is assumed
to depreciate fully in one period.  This assumption is particularly reasonable when physical
capital is interpreted as human capital.
Each generation consists of a continuum of homogenous agents with unit mass. (Sections
7.1 and 7.2 introduce heterogeneous agents.)  Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor in the
first period, which is supplied inelastically to the final goods sector, and consumes only in the
second.  Thus, Lt = 1, and the wage income, wt, is also equal to the level of wealth held by the
young agents at the end of period t.  They allocate their wealth, wt, in order to finance their
consumption in period t+1.  They have two options.  First, they may lend it in the competitive
credit market, which earns the gross return equal to rt+1 per unit.  If they lend the entire wealth,
their second-period consumption is equal to rt+1wt.  Second, they may start an investment project.
The project comes in discrete, nondivisible units and each young agent can run only one
project.
12  The project transforms one unit of the final good in period t into R > 0 units of capital
in period t+1.  To avoid a taxonomical exposition, we focus on the case where
(A1) W(R) < 1.
As seen later, (A1) ensures that wt < 1, so that the agent needs to borrow 1wt > 0 in the
competitive credit market, in order to start the project.  It is also assumed that the agent cannot
start a project abroad (or it is prohibitively costly to do so).  In other words, foreign direct
investment is ruled out.
13
The two assumptions, the factors are nontradeable and the agent cannot start a project
abroad, are imposed to focus on the effects of financial market globalization, not those of factor
market globalization.  What is essential here is that an imperfect integration of factor markets
                                                                       
12Note that, even though each agent faces an indivisible investment technology, aggregate technology is convex,
because there is a continuum of agents in each country that invest in the same indivisible project.  The assumption
that each agent can run at most one project is made for the simplicity and can be dropped (see Section 7.2).
13This restriction is also reasonable if physical capital and the investment project are interpreted as human capital and
education.10
generates a home bias in the demand spillover effects of the domestic investment.  A higher
domestic investment increases the wealth of the domestic young agents more than the wealth of
the foreign young agents.
We are now ready to look at the investment decision.  The second period consumption, if
the agent starts the project, is equal to t+1Rrt+1 (1wt).  This is greater than or equal to rt+1wt
(the second period consumption if the agent lends the entire wage income) when the net present
discounted value of the project, t+1R/rt+1  1, is nonnegative.  This condition can be expressed as
(1) Rf(kt+1)  rt+1.
The young agents are willing to borrow and to start the project, when (1) holds. We shall call (1)
the profitability constraint.
The credit market is competitive in the sense that both lenders and borrowers take the
equilibrium rate, rt+1, given. It is not competitive, however, in the sense that one cannot borrow
any amount at the equilibrium rate. The borrowing limit exists because the borrowers can pledge
only up to a fraction of the project revenue for the repayment.  More specifically, the borrower
would not be able to credibly commit to repay more than t+1R, where 0 <  < 1. Knowing this,
the lender would lend only up to t+1R/rt+1.  Thus, the agent can start the project only if 1wt 	
t+1R/rt+1, or
(2) Rf(kt+1)  rt+1(1W(kt)).
We shall call (2) the borrowing constraint.
14  It is also assumed that the same commitment
problem rules out the possibility that different agents may pool their wealth to overcome the
borrowing constraint. The young agents in period t start the project, only when both (1) and (2)
are satisfied.  In other words, they must be both willing and able to borrow. The parameter, ,
captures the credit market friction in a parsimonious way.  If it were zero, the agents would never
be able to borrow and hence must self-finance their projects entirely.  If it were equal to one, the
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borrowing constraint would never be binding whenever the agents want to borrow.  By setting it
between zero and one, this specification allows us to examine the whole range of intermediate
cases between the two extremes.  The reader may thus want to interpret this formulation simply
as a black box, a convenient way of introducing the credit market imperfection in a dynamic
macroeconomic model, without worrying about the underlying causes of imperfections.
15
The two constraints, (1) and (2), can be summarized as
 (rt+1/f(kt+1))(1W(kt))/ if kt < K(),
(3) R  Rt  
rt+1/f(kt+1)i f  k t  K(),
where Rt may be interpreted as the project productivity required in order for the project to be
undertaken in period t, and K() is defined implicitly by W(K()) = 1.  Note that which of the
two constraints is binding depends entirely on kt.  The borrowing constraint (2) is binding if kt <
K(); the profitability constraint (1) is binding if kt > K().  Thus, the investment is borrowing
constrained only at the lower level of the domestic wealth. The critical value of k, K(), is
decreasing in , with K(1) = 0 and K(+0) = R
+, where R
+ is given by W(R
+) = 1.  Thus, the less
imperfect the credit market, the less important the borrowing constraint becomes, and if the
credit market is perfect ( = 1), the borrowing constraint is never binding.
4. The Autarky Case.
Let us first consider the case of autarky.  Without international lending and borrowing,
the domestic investment (by the young) must be equal to the domestic saving (by the young) in
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can pledge only up to a fraction of the project revenue.  The simplest story would be that they strategically default,
whenever the repayment obligation exceeds the default cost, which is proportional to the project revenue.
Alternatively, each project is specific to the borrower, and requires his services to produce R units of physical
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services, can renegotiate the repayment obligation down to t+1R.  See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).  It is also
possible to use the costly-state-verification approach used by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Boyd and Smith
(1997), or the ex-ante moral hazard approach used by Aghion and Bolton (1997) or the ex-post moral hazard
approach used by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).12
equilibrium.
16 From (3), the domestic investment is equal to zero if Rt > R, and to one, if Rt < R,
and may take any value between zero and one if Rt = R.  The domestic saving is equal to W(kt),
which is less than one, if kt < R, from (A1).  Thus, in equilibrium, Rt = R and the aggregate
investment is made equal to W(kt).  Thus, the fraction of the young agents who become
borrowers and start the project is equal to W(kt), while the rest, 1W(kt), become lenders.  If kt 
K(), the young agents are indifferent between borrowing and lending.  When kt < K(), on the
other hand, they strictly prefer borrowing to lending.  Therefore, the equilibrium allocation
necessarily involves credit rationing, where the fraction 1W(kt) of the young agents are denied
the credit.  Those who are denied the credit cannot entice the potential lenders by raising the
interest rate, because the lenders would know that the borrowers would default at a higher rate.
17
Since the measure of the young agents who start the project is equal to W(kt) and every
one of them supplies R units of physical capital in period t+1,
(4) kt+1 = RW(kt).
Eq. (4) completely describes the dynamics of capital formation in autarky.  Note that, if kt < R,
kt+1 = RW(kt) < RW(R) < R from (A1).  Therefore, k0 < R implies kt < R and wt = W(kt) < 1 for
all t > 0, as has been assumed.
Notably, the dynamics of k, (4), is entirely independent of ; the credit market
imperfection has no effect on the capital formation in the autarky case.  This is because the
domestic investment is determined entirely by the domestic saving.  Any effect of the credit
market imperfection is completely absorbed by the interest rate movements.  From (3), (4), and R
                                                                       
16The GNP accounting of a closed economy, of course, implies that the saving by all the residents is equal to the
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17In the present model, credit rationing is an inevitable feature of the equilibrium whenever the borrowing constraint
is binding. This is, however, a mere artifact of the homogeneity of the agents. It can be show that, in a more general
setup that allows for heterogeneous agents, what is essential is the borrowing constraint, not credit rationing.  See
Section 7.1 and 7.2.  See also Matsuyama (2001, Section 6).13
= Rt, the equilibrium interest rate is given by
Rf(RW(kt))/(1W(kt)) if kt < K(),
(5) rt+1 =
Rf(RW(kt)) if kt  K().
Note that a greater imperfection in the credit market (a smaller ) manifests itself in the reduction
of the interest rate.
Clearly, the result that the dynamics of capital formation in autarky is unaffected by the
credit market imperfection is not a robust feature of the model.  In particular, it critically depends
on the fact that the aggregate supply of the credit is inelastic.  Nevertheless, this feature of the
model makes the autarky case a useful benchmark for examining the effects of financial market
globalization in the presence of the credit market imperfection.  What is essential here is that the
aggregate supply of the credit is less elastic in autarky than in an open economy.
The dynamics of capital formation in autarky, given by Eq. (4), even though it is independent of
, may still have multiple steady states.  This feature of the overlapping generations model is
well-known (see, e.g. Azariadis 1993) and it is a nuisance that has nothing to do with the credit
market imperfection. To avoid any unnecessary complications that arise from this feature of
overlapping generations model, we impose the following assumption:
(A2) W(0) =  and W(k) < 0.
Many standard production functions imply (A2).  For example, if y = f(k) = A(k)
  with 0 < 
 <
1, W(k) = (1
)A(k)
, which satisfies (A2).
As shown in Figure 1a, (A1) and (A2) ensures that Eq. (4) has the unique steady state, k*
= K*(R)  (0,R), defined implicitly by k* = RW(k*), and for k0  (0,R), kt converges
monotonically to k* = K*(R).  The function, K*(R), is increasing and satisfies K*(0) = 0 and
K*(R
+) = R
+.  (Recall that R
+ was defined by W(R
+) = 1.)  It is worth emphasizing that K*(R),
the steady state level of k, is independent of , and K(), the critical level of k, below which the14
borrowing constraint is binding, is independent of R.  Therefore, the borrowing constraint may or
may not be binding in the steady state.
To summarize,
Proposition 1. In autarky, the dynamics of k is given by kt+1 = RW(kt), which is independent of
, and converges monotonically to the unique steady state, K*(R), where K*(R) is increasing in
R and satisfies K*(0) = 0 and K*(R
+) = R
+.  If K*(R) < K(), the borrowing constraint is binding
in the steady state.  If K*(R) > K(), the profitability constraint is binding in the steady state.
Figures 1a and Figure 1b illustrate Proposition 1.  The downward-sloping curve in Figure 1b is
given by K*(R) = K(), which connects (,R) = (0,R
+) and (,R) = (1,0).  Below and left to this
curve, the autarky steady state is borrowing-constrained.
5. The Small Open Economy
Let us now examine the small open economy case, which serves as a preliminary step for
the analysis of the world economy in the presence of the international financial market.
The agents in the small open economy are allowed to trade intertemporally the final good
with the rest of the world at exogenously given prices.  In other words, international lending and
borrowing is allowed.  The interest rate, the intertemporal price of the final good, is exogenously
given in the international financial market and assumed to be invariant over time: rt+1 = r.
In what follows, we will focus on the case Rf(R) < r for the ease of exposition.
18 Then,
the equilibrium condition is given by setting Rt = R in (3), which can be further rewritten as
(r(1W(kt))/R)  if  kt < K(),
(6) kt+1 = (kt) 
(r/R) if kt  K(),
                                                                       
18If Rf(R)  r, the dynamics is given by kt+1 = min{R , (kt)}, where (kt) is defined as in eq. (6).  Assuming Rf(R)
< r ensures kt+1 = (kt) < R, and hence the equilibrium is never at the corner. This restriction helps to reduce the
notational burden significantly, but the result can be easily extended to the case where Rf(R)  r as well.  This
restriction can also be justified on the ground that, in the world economy version of the model developed later, the
world interest rate prevailing in any steady state satisfies Rf(R) < r.15
where  is the inverse of f, which is a decreasing function and satisfies () = 0.
Eq. (6) governs the dynamics of the small open economy.  Unlike in the autarky case, the
domestic investment is no longer equal to the domestic saving. Instead, the investment is
determined entirely by the profitability and borrowing constraints. If the credit market were
perfect ( = 1 and K(1) = 0), the economy would immediately jumps to (r/R), from any initial
condition.   In the presence of the imperfection, this occurs only when the economy is at the
higher level of development (kt  K()), where the profitability of the project is the only binding
constraint.  At the lower level of development (kt < K()), the borrowing constraint is binding,
which creates the gap between the return to investment and the interest rate.  In this range, the
map is increasing in kt.  This is because a high domestic investment increases the wage income of
the domestic young agents, enabling them to accumulate more wealth, which alleviates the
borrowing constraint and stimulate the domestic investment.  This effect is essentially the same
with the credit multiplier effect identified by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and others.  In this
range, the map is also increasing in R/r.  In particular, a reduction in  reduces kt+1. In a small
open economy, the interest rate is fixed in the international financial market.  Therefore, a greater
imperfection has the effect of reducing the domestic investment (and channeling more of the
domestic saving into investment abroad).  This differs significantly from the autarky case, where
the domestic investment was determined by the domestic saving, and a reduction in  reduces
rt+1, but has no effect on kt+1.
The steady states of the small open economy are given by the fixed points of the map (6),
satisfying k = (k).  The following lemma summarizes some properties of the set of the fixed
points.  While elementary, they turn out to be quite useful, and will be evoked repeatedly in the
subsequent discussion.
Lemma.
a) Eq. (6) has at least one steady state.
b) Eq. (6) has at most one steady state above K().  If it exists, it is stable and equal to (r/R).16
c) Eq. (6) has at most two steady states below K().  If there is only one, kL, either it satisfies 0 <
kL < R/r and is stable, or, kL = R/r at which  is tangent to the 45 line.  If there are two, kL
and kM, they satisfy 0 < kL < R/r < kM < K(), and kL is stable and kM is unstable.
Proof.  See Matsuyama (2001).
One immediate implication of Lemma is that there are only three generic cases of the dynamics
generated by (6).  They are illustrated in Figures 2a-2c.  In Figure 2a, the unique fixed point, kL,
is located below K(), to which kt converges from any k0  (0,R).  In Figure 2c, the unique fixed
point, kH = (r/R), is located above K(), to which kt converges from any k0  (0,R).  In Figure
2b, there are three fixed points; two stable steady states, kL and kH, are separated by the third
(unstable) steady state, kM, which is located between kL and K(), and kt converges to kL if k0 <
kM and to kH if k0 > kM.
19
The following proposition provides the exact condition for each of the three cases.
Proposition 2.   Let c  (0,1) be defined by f(K(c)) = 1.  Then,
a) If Rf(K()) < r, there exists a unique steady state, kL.  It is stable and satisfies kL < K().
b) If  Rf(K()) > r, f(R/r) < 1, and  < c, there exist three steady states, kL, kM, and kH.
They satisfy kL < kM < K() < kH, and kL and kH are stable and kM is unstable.
c) If Rf(K()) > r and either f(R/r) > 1 or  > c, there exists a unique steady state, kH.  It
is stable and satisfies kH > K().
Proof.  See Matsuyama (2001).
Proposition 2 is illustrated by Figure 3.  The conditions for Proposition 2a), 2b) and 2c) are
satisfied in Region A, B, and C, respectively.  The outer limit of Region A is given by Rf(K())
= r, and the border between Regions B and C are given by f(R/r) = 1.  These two downward-
sloping curves meet tangentially at  = c.
                                                                       
19Figures 2a-2c are drawn so that  >0 for k < K(). This may or may not be true. Note that Lemma c) does not say
that the map is convex in this range.  It says that it cannot intersect the 45	 line more than twice in this range.17
Proposition 2 states that the dynamics of capital formation in the small open economy
differ drastically from the autarky case.  The difference is most significant when the world
interest rate is such that the parameters lie in Region B, as illustrated by point P in Figure 3.  In
this case, an integration of this economy to the international financial market creates multiple
steady states, as shown in Figure 2b.  Around kM, the investment is borrowing constrained, and
the dynamics is unstable.  If the integration occurs slightly below kM, the economy experiences
vicious circles of low-wealth/low-investment, and will gravitate toward the lower stable steady
state, kL, in which the borrowing constraint is binding.  On the other hand, if the integration takes
place slightly above kM, the economy experiences virtuous circles of high-wealth/high-
investment, and eventually converges to the higher stable steady state, kH, in which the
borrowing constraint is no longer binding.  This case thus suggests that the timing of the
integration has significant permanent effects on the capital formation.
This does not mean, however, that the integration would have negligible effects on the
capital formation in other cases.  For example, suppose that the world interest rate is such that the
parameters lie in Region C.  In this case, the economy will eventually converge to the unique
steady state, in which the borrowing constraint is not binding.  This process could take long time,
however, because the economy must go though the “narrow corridor” between the map and the
45 line, as illustrated in Figure 2c.  More generally, as a comparison between the shapes of the
two maps, kt+1 = RW(kt) and kt+1 = (kt), suggests, the integration would slow down the growth
process of middle-income economies.
Let us now consider the effect of a change in the world interest rate on the capital
formation of the small open economy.  We focus on the case, where the parameters lie in Region
B, depicted by P in Figure 3, and the dynamics is hence illustrated by Figure 2b.  Suppose that
the economy is trapped in kL.  A decline in the world interest rate, illustrated in Figure 3 as the
vertical move from point P in Region B to point P in Region C eliminates kL and the dynamics is
now illustrated by Figure 2c.  The decline in the interest rate thus helps the economy to escape
from the trap and to start a (perhaps long and slow) process of growth toward kH.  Furthermore,
even a temporary decline in the interest rate could have similar steady state effects.  Once the
economy accumulates enough capital, the economy will not fall back to the trap, when the18
interest rate returns to the original level.  Therefore, even a small, temporary decline in the
interest rate could have a significant permanent effect.
20  Similarly, one could show that even a
small, temporary rise in the world interest rate could lead to a permanent stagnation of the
economy, if it is initially located at kH in Figure 2b.
One might be tempted to argue that Region B of Figure 3, which gives rise to the
dynamics illustrated in Figure 2b with multiple stable steady states, can be used to explain
endogenous inequality of nations. Imagine that there are two small open countries, called N and
S, which share the same technology, the same demographic structure, etc.  Furthermore, both
countries are fully integrated into the international financial market and face the same world
interest rate.  The only difference is that the capital stock in N is equal to kH and the capital stock
in S is equal to kL.  The model does explain why this situation can persist, because both kH and kL
are stable steady states of the dynamics, if the parameters lie in Region B of Figure 3.
While suggestive, this argument explains why it is possible that two otherwise identical
countries perform differently, but does not say that it is inevitable.  Indeed, the situation in which
the capital stocks are both equal to kH in N and S and the situation in which they are both equal to
kL in N and S (as well as the situation in which it is equal to kH in S and kL in N) are also stable
steady states under the same condition.  The argument does not offer any reason why one should
believe that the separation of the world economy into the rich and the poor is a more plausible.
In other words, the small open economy version of the model cannot impose any restriction on
the equilibrium degree of inequality, because it takes into account no interaction between the
dynamics of different countries.
To resolve this problem, therefore, one must move beyond the small open economy
framework, and analyze the model from a global perspective.  In the next section, the world
economy version of the model is analyzed.  This helps not only to endogenize the world interest
rate, but also to address the issue of endogenous inequality in a more satisfactory manner.
Analyzing the model from a global perspective is also important for the policy analysis.
From the prospective of an individual country, escaping from the poverty trap may appear
                                                                       
20Of course, how small the decline can be in order to have the permanent effect depends on the distance between
point P and the border between Regions B and Region C.  Furthermore, the larger the decline, the shorter it can be to
have the permanent effect.19
simple. One might be tempted to argue that the poor countries should temporarily cut their
financial links or that foreign aids from the rich countries should solve the problem.  The global
perspective will show, however, why these measures may not be able to eliminate the poverty
trap.
6. The World Economy
The world economy is made up of a continuum of inherently identical countries with unit
mass.  In the absence of the international financial market, this is merely a collection of the
autarky economies analyzed in section 4.  Hence one can immediately conclude that the world
economy would converge to the symmetric steady state, in which each country holds K*(R) units
of the capital stock.  In short, the world economy has a unique steady state, which is symmetric
and globally stable.
In what follows, let us assume that all the countries are fully integrated in the
international financial market, where each country faces the same interest rate.  The world
economy can hence be viewed as a collection of inherently identical small open economies of the
type analyzed in section 5.  Since the world as a whole is a closed economy, the interest rate is
now endogenously determined to equate the world saving and the world investment.
The presence of the international financial market does not change the fact that the state
in which every country has the capital stock equal to K*(R) is a steady state.  However, it may
change the stability property of the symmetric steady state.  Furthermore, it may create stable
steady states, which are not symmetric.  We need to characterize the entire set of stable steady
states of the world economy.
In any stable steady state of the world economy, each country must be at a stable steady
state of the small open economy.  As stated in Lemma, there are at most two stable steady states
in which each small open economy can be located.  This means that a stable steady state of the
world economy must be one of the following two types.  The first type is the case of perfect
equality.  In such a steady state, all the countries have the same level of capital, k*.  The second
type is the case of endogenous inequality.  In such a steady state, the world economy is polarized
into the rich and the poor, in which the poor (rich) countries have the same level of capital stock,
given by kL (kH), which satisfies kL < K() <  kH.  The next two subsections derive the condition20
for the existence of these two types of stable steady states.  (The reader not interested in the
derivation may want to skim through these subsections and move onto Section 6.3., at least on
the first reading.)
6.1. The Steady State with Equality of Nations.
Suppose that all the countries have the same level of capital stock, k*, in a steady state.
Then, the world saving is equal to W(k*).  Since the world economy as a whole is closed, the
measure of the young agents that invest in this steady state must be equal to W(k*).  Since every
one of them produces R units of capital, the steady state capital must satisfy k* = RW(k*), or
equivalently, k* = K*(R).  If k* = K*(R) > K(), the borrowing constraint is not binding, hence
the world interest rate in this steady state is r = Rf(K*(R)) < Rf(K()).  This inequality can be
rewritten as (r/R) > K(), which is exactly the condition under which a small open economy
has a stable steady state, kH = (r/R) = K*(R) = k*.  (See also Proposition 2b)-2c).)  This proves
that K*(R) > K() is the condition under which there exists a stable steady state in which all the
countries have the same level of capital stock, k* = K*(R) > K().
If k* = K*(R) < K(), the borrowing constraint is binding, hence the world interest rate in
this steady state is r = Rf(K*(R))/[1W(K*(R))].  From c) of Lemma, k* = K*(R) < K() is a
stable steady state for each small open economy, if and only if it satisfies k* = K*(R) < R/r =
[1W(K*(R))]/f(K*(R)).  This condition can be rewritten to K*(R)f(K*(R)) + W(K*(R)) =
f(K*(R)) < 1.  This proves that K*(R) < K() and f(K*(R)) < 1 are the condition under which
there exists a stable steady state in which all the countries have the same level of capital stock, k*
= K*(R) < K().
The above argument also shows that, if K*(R) < K() and f(K*(R)) > 1, a symmetric
steady state, in which all the countries have the same level of capital stock, is unstable.   To see
this, in such a steady state, the capital stock in each country must be equal to k* = K*(R) < K(),
which means that the borrowing constraint is binding.  Therefore, the world interest rate is equal
to r = Rf(K*(R))/[1W(K*(R))].  When f(K*(R)) > 1, this implies k* = K*(R) > R/r, which
means that k* = kM from Lemma c).  Thus, it is unstable.  Figure 4 illustrates this situation.
Suppose that there is no international financial market at the beginning.  Then, the dynamics of21
every country follows kt+1 = RW(kt), which converges to K*(R).  In this steady state, the interest
rates are equal across countries, even though there is no international lending and borrowing.  If
the international financial market is open at this point, the dynamics of each country is now
governed by kt+1 = (kt), which cut the 45 line from below at K*(R).  This situation is unstable,
even though it is still a steady state.
To summarize the above,
Proposition 3. Let Rc  (0,R
+) be defined by f(K*(Rc)) = 1.  Then,
a) If K*(R) < K() and R < Rc, the state in which all the countries have k* = K*(R), is a
stable steady state of the world economy.
b) If K*(R) < K() and R > Rc, there exists no stable steady state in which all the countries
have the same level of capital stock.
c) If K*(R) > K(), the state in which all the countries have k* = K*(R), is a stable steady
state of the world economy.
Note Rc satisfies K*(Rc) = K(c); it is well-defined in (0,R
+), since f(K*(0)) = 0 < 1 = W(R
+) <
f(K*(R
+)) and f(K*(R)) is strictly increasing and continuous in R.
Figure 5 illustrates the conditions in Proposition 3. In Regions A and AB, the condition in
Proposition 3a) is satisfied.  In Region B, the condition in Proposition 3b) is satisfied.  In
Regions BC and C, the condition in Proposition 3c) is satisfied.  The border between Regions AB
and B is given by f(K*(R)) = 1, i.e., R = Rc.  The border between Regions B and BC (as well as
the border between A and C) is given by K*(R) = K().  Note that, when the credit market
imperfection is significant ( < c), the stability of the symmetric steady state requires that the
productivity of the investment project, R, is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low.  For an
intermediate range of R, the condition in Proposition 3b) holds and the symmetric steady state is
unstable.
6.2. Steady States with Endogenous Inequality of Nations.22
Suppose now that the world economy is a stable steady state, in which a fraction X of the
countries have the capital stock equal to kL < K(), and a fraction 1X of the countries have the
capital stock equal to kH > K().  Since all the countries face the same world interest rate, kL and
kH must satisfy Rf(kH) =  r = Rf(kL)/(1W(kL)), or
(7) f(kH) = f(kL)/(1W(kL)),
in addition to
(8) kL < K() <  kH.
From Lemma b), kt = kH is a stable steady state for each small open economy.  From Lemma c),
the stability of kt = kL requires kL < R/r = [1W(kL)]/f(kL), which can be rewritten to kLf(kL) +
W(kL) = f(kL) < 1, or
(9) kL < K*(Rc) = K(c).
Since the young agents in the fraction X of the countries earn W(kL) and those in the
fraction 1X earn W(kH), the world saving is given by XW(kL) +(1X)W(kH), which is equal to
the world investment, which produces R units of capital per unit.  Hence, the total capital stock
must satisfy
(10) XkL + (1X)kH = XRW(kL) +(1X)RW(kH).
A stable steady state with endogenous inequality exists if there are kL and kH that solve (7)-(10).
Proposition 4.   Let Rc  (0,R
+) and c  (0,1) be defined by f(K*(Rc)) = f(K(c)) = 1. The world
economy has a continuum of stable steady states, in which a fraction X  (X
, X
+)  (0,1) of the
countries have the capital stock, kL < K(), and a fraction 1 X of the countries have the capital23
stock equal to kH > K(), if and only if  < c, f(K()) > f(K*(R))/[1W(K*(R))] where R <
Rc, and  < f(K*(R))K(c).   Furthermore, X
 > 0 if R > Rc and X
+ < 1 if K*(R) < K().
Proof. See Matsuyama (2001).
The condition of Proposition 4 is satisfied in Regions AB, B, and BC of Figure 5.  The border
between A and AB is given by f(K()) = f(K*(R))/[1W(K*(R))]  with R < Rc and  < c.  It
is upward-sloping and connecting (,R) = (0,0) and (,R) = (c,Rc).  The border between BC and
C is given by f(K*(R))K(c) = .  This curve is downward-sloping, and stays above K*(R) =
K() for < c, and tangent to it at (,R) = (c,Rc).
21  Note that the existence of these asymmetric
steady states requires that the credit market imperfection is significant ( < c), and that the
productivity of the investment project, R, is neither too low nor too high.
22
6.3. The Effects of Financial Market Globalization: Discussion.
Having characterized all the stable steady states, we are now ready to discuss the effects
of financial market globalization.  In Regions A and C of Figure 5, there is a unique stable steady
state, which is symmetric.  In both cases, the model predicts no endogenous inequality across
countries. In Region A, the investment is borrowing-constrained in each country.  In Region C,
the borrowing
constraint is not binding in any country.  In Region B, there is no stable steady state with perfect
equality. Even though there is a continuum of stable steady states, they all show that the long-run
distribution of the capital stock, and hence those of the income, the wage, the investment rate,
etc, have two mass points. In Region B, the model predicts symmetry-breaking; the co-existence
of rich and poor nations is an inevitable feature of the world economy.  In Region AB, and
Region BC, these two types of the steady states co-exist.
                                                                       
21To see this, let 
()  f(K())K(c)  .  Then, 
(c) = f(K(c))K(c)  c = f(K(c))K(c) f(K(c)) + (1  c) =
(1  c) W(K(c)) = 0, and 
()  f (K())K(c)K()  1 = K(c)/K()  1 < 0 for  < c, since K() =
1/f(K())K() by differentiating W(K()) =  1  .  Therefore, 
() > 
(c) = 0 for  < c.  Thus,  =
f(K*(R))K(c) implies f(K())K(c) >  = f(K*(R))K(c) or K*(R) > K() for  < c.  The tangency follows from

(c) = 0.
22If we drop (A1) and allow R to be greater than R
+, the border between BC and C extends above R
+.  Hence, these
asymmetric steady states disappear not only when R is sufficiently low, but also when it is sufficiently high.24
The prediction of the model is most stark when the parameters lie in Region B of Figure
5, the case of symmetry-breaking.  See also Figure 4.  In this case, K*(R) < K() so that, in the
absence of the international financial market, each country is in autarky and will converge to the
same steady state, in which the borrowing constraint is binding. Despite that each country is
borrowing-constrained, this symmetric steady state is stable. This is because the interest rates can
adjust independently across countries, when different countries are hit by different shocks.  In the
presence of the international financial market, however, the symmetric steady state loses its
stability. This is because the integration forces the interest rates in different countries to move
together.  In other words, all the agents must compete for the world saving in the international
financial market; they all have to guarantee the same return, regardless of their locations.  This
put the agents living in countries hit by worse shocks in disadvantage, compared to those living
in countries hit by better shocks.  This creates vicious circles of low-investment/low-wealth in
the unlucky countries and virtuous circles of high-investment/high wealth in the lucky countries.
The only asymmetric steady states are stable in Region B.  That is to say, in any stable steady
state, the world economy is polarized into the rich and the poor.  This case thus captures the
structualist view that the international financial market magnifies the inequality of nations and
that a separation of the world economy into the rich and the poor is an inevitable feature of the
International Economic Order.  The rich accumulate enough capital that the borrowing constraint
is no longer binding, while it is binding for the poor (kL < K() < kH).  One can also show that,
from (A2) and (10), kL < K*(R) < kH in these steady states.  That is to say, the rich countries
become richer and the poor become poorer than in autarky.  Furthermore, the world output in
these steady states is strictly lower than in the symmetric steady state.
23  Therefore, this case
offers a theoretical support for the popular view that the international financial market is a
mechanism through which rich countries become richer at the expense of poor countries and at
the expense of the world economy as a whole.
                                                                       




 f(k(z))dz,  s.t. 
0
1
 k(z)dz   
0
1
 RW(k(z))dz, where k(z) is the capital stock in country z 
[0,1]. Since the feasibility set is convex and the objective function is symmetric and strictly quasi-concave, the
solution is k(z) = k* for all z [0,1], where k* satisfies k* = RW(k*).  That is, the world output is maximized when
k(z) = K*(R) for all z [0,1].25
When the world economy is polarized, the countries that became poor find themselves in
the stable steady state with the binding borrowing constraint, kL in Figure 2b.  From a perspective
of an individual country, the problems of poor countries may seem easy to solve.  It may appear
that, in order to escape the poverty trap and to join the club of rich countries, all the government
has to do is to cut its link to the international financial market temporarily.  The global
perspective, however, offers a different view.  Such temporary isolationist policy cannot work
when attempted by all the countries.  This is because, once the restriction is removed, a positive
measure of countries must find themselves in the lower steady state.  (Note that, in Region B, a
fraction of the countries that become poor is bounded away from zero.)  Similar points can be
made for a joint attempt for the poor countries to cut their links to the rich countries and to unite
among themselves to form a bloc.  It is impossible for all of them to escape from the poverty trap
because the same analysis would apply to the bloc newly formed.  Nor would a one-time
redistribution from the rich countries eliminate inequality.  This is because K*(R) < K() in
Region B.  That is, one of the reasons why the symmetric steady state is unstable is that there is
not enough saving in the world economy to finance the investment required to make all the
countries rich.   As long as the parameters lie in Region B of Figure 5, some countries must be
excluded from being rich, just as in a game of musical chairs.
24
6.4. The Effect of Technological Progress: An Application
Throughout the discussion above, we have taken the integration of the financial markets
as the sole exogenous change in the world economy, by keeping R fixed.  Alternatively, one
could examine the effects of an exogenous change in R, while taking the integration of the
financial markets as given.  If such a change passes the border of Region B, then the world
economy experiences a symmetry-breaking bifurcation.  For example, consider the following
thought experiment, which arguably traces the evolution of the world economy.  Suppose  < c
and R is sufficient small so that the parameters lie in Region A.  Then, let R increase gradually.
Imagine that this exogenous technological progress is sufficiently slow that one could
                                                                       
24When the parameters lie in Region BC and the world economy is in the polarized steady state, a one-time
redistribution from the rich to the poor can eliminate inequality and move the world economy into the symmetric
steady state.26
approximate the state of the world economy by a stable steady state.  Initially, the world economy
is in A, so that all the countries are equally poor and the borrowing constraint is binding in each
country. Even when an increase in R pushes the world economy in Region AB, this situation
does not change, because the symmetric steady state remains stable.  This changes when a further
increase in R makes R > Rc and the world economy enters Region B.  Then, the symmetry is
broken and endogenous inequality begins to appear. Some, but not all, countries start growing
rapidly.  These countries become sufficiently rich and that the borrowing constraint is no longer
binding.  The rest of the world is left behind.  As R continues to rise, more and more countries
start growing and catch up with the rich.  Once R becomes big enough to push the world
economy in Region C, then the catching up process is completed and the symmetry is restored.
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According to this thought experiment, the world economy experiences divergence first, and then
convergence, a Kuznets inverted U-curve, because the endogenous components of inequality
change as the parameter moves in the symmetry-breaking region.  It should also be noted that this
thought experiment suggests that the symmetry-breaking and the presence of stable asymmetric
steady states are perfectly consistent with the evidence of “convergence” in the long run
evolution of the world income distribution.
7.  Alternative Specifications
In the above model, many assumptions are made in order to simplify the analysis, to
minimize the numbers of the parameters, and not to distract the reader’s attention away from the
main goal of the paper. Some of the results obviously depend on these simplifying assumptions,
but the key result of the model,--financial market globalization may cause symmetry-breaking--,
is robust to many alternative specifications. To understand the robustness, note that symmetry-
breaking occurs due to the following features of the model:
  For a fixed domestic interest rate, the domestic investment is an increasing function of the
wealth held by the domestic entrepreneurs in the lower range.
  The domestic investment increases the wealth held by the domestic entrepreneurs (more than
that of the foreign entrepreneurs).
                                                                       
25Figure 5 seems to suggest that symmetry could not be restored for a small .  However, if we drop (A1) and let R
greater than R
+, then a sufficiently large R pushes the world economy into Region C for any  < c.27
  The domestic interest rate adjusts to balance the domestic supply and domestic demand for
credit in the absence of the international financial market, while it is linked to the foreign
interest rate in the presence of the international financial market.
As long as these features of the model are maintained, alternative specifications would not
eliminate the key result, although they would considerably complicate the analysis. This section
gives brief sketches of how the analysis needs to be modified when alternative specifications are
used.
7.1. Heterogeneous Agents and Wealth Inequality within Each Country
The basic model assumes that the agents are homogeneous.  They are equally productive
as an entrepreneur. Their labor endowment is identical, which means that there is no wealth
inequality across the young agents within each country. The latter, in particular, may lead one to
conjecture that the symmetry-breaking case would disappear if there were enough wealth
inequality within each country to allow for the possibility that some young agents in the poor
countries may be rich. This subsection shows that such a conjecture is false, by extending the
model to allow the agents to differ in their endowment.
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Let G(z) denote the cumulative distribution of the labor endowment of the young agents,
z, with its density function, g(z) = G(z) > 0, and its mean being equal to one. Thus, G(z) presents
the fraction of the agents whose wealth is less than zwt at the end of period t. In autarky, the
domestic interest rate adjusts so as to make the domestic investment determined by the domestic
saving.  The investment is made by the W(kt) richest young agents, i.e., the agents with z 
G
1(1W(kt)), and eq. (4) continues to govern the dynamics in autarky, regardless of whether the
borrowing constraint is binding or not.  Consider now the small open economy case. If Rf(kt+1) >
r, all the young agents are willing to invest, but only those agents who are rich enough to satisfy
the borrowing constraint,
(2) Rf(kt+1)  rt+1(1  zW(kt)),
                                                                       
26Matsuyama (2001, Section 6) discusses an extension in which the agents differ in productivity, R.28
can borrow and invest.  Thus, the domestic investment is equal to 1G([1Rf(kt+1)/r]/W(kt)).
Thus, kt+1 is given by the unique solution of kt+1 = R[1G([1Rf(kt+1)/r]/W(kt))], as long as it
satisfies Rf(kt+1) > r.  By denoting this unique solution by (kt; , R, r), the dynamics of the
small open economy can be expressed by
(kt; , R, r) if kt < K(, R, r),
(6)k t+1 =
(r/R) if kt  K(, R, r),
where K(, R, r) is defined uniquely by K that solves (r/R) = R[1G((1)/W(K))].  It is easy
to verify that Eq. (6) is a limit case of Eq. (6), as G(z)  0 for z < 1 and G(z)  1 for z  1.
Note that Eq. (6) has many of the key features of Eq. (6).  For kt < K(, R, r), Rf(kt+1) > r, so
that the profitability constraint is not binding.  What determines the domestic investment is the
borrowing constraint, which is binding for the marginal agent, i.e., the agent with z =
[1Rf(kt+1)/r]/W(kt).  In this range, the map is increasing in kt, R, and /r, because an increase
in these variables allow the agent with lower endowments to satisfy the borrowing constraint.
For kt  K(, R, r), Rf(kt+1) = r, so that the profitability constraint determines the domestic
investment.  In this range, the map is flat.  Note that these key features of the map (6) would not
disappear even if there were a few, very rich young agents in each country (that is, even if G has
a thin, but long upper tail.)  There are two notable differences between Eq. (6) and Eq. (6).  First,
the threshold level of kt below which the borrowing constraint determines the domestic
investment is no longer independent of R nor r.  Second, the map (6) may have more than one
stable intersection with the 45 line below K(, R, r).
In the world economy case, it is straightforward to show that stable asymmetric steady
states exist whenever the symmetric steady state is unstable.  Thus, the condition for symmetry-
breaking can be derived by finding the condition under which the slope of the map (6) is less
than one when evaluated at the symmetric steady state, where kt = K*(R) and r = r*, where r* is
the unique solution to W(K*(R)) = 1G([1Rf(K*(R))/r*]/W(K*(R))).  A complete
characterization of asymmetric stable states is hopelessly complicated. This is because there may29
be more than two stable steady states of the small open economy, which dramatically increases
the number of the types of the steady states for the world economy.  If there are m stable steady
states for the small open economy, 2
m  1  m different types of the stable asymmetric steady
states for the world economy need to be distinguished, and only m!/(m  2)!2! of them are
characterized by a two-point distribution.
7.2. Allowing Agents to Run More than One Project
It has been assumed so far that the young agent can run at most one, indivisible
investment project.  That is, the project technology of each young agent may be written as y(i) =
0 for 0 	 i < 1 and y(i) = R for i  1.  The assumption that each young agent runs at most one
project is reasonable, when capital is interpreted as human capital and the project is interpreted as
education, such as going to college.   Nevertheless, one might think that the result in the previous
subsection may depend critically on this assumption.  One’s intuition might say that symmetry-
breaking would not happen if a few rich agents in the poor countries were allowed to run as many
projects as they want.  If so, one’s intuition is faulty.  If the rich agents in the poor countries were
allowed to run multiple projects, they would expand their operations until their borrowing
constraint would become binding.  Therefore, at the margin, the domestic investment is still
constrained by the domestic wealth in the poor countries.
To see this formally, let us now assume that the project technology of each young agent is
given by y(i) = 0 for 0 	 i < 1 and y(i) = Ri for i  1.  The agent is still subject to the minimum
investment requirement of one, but once this requirement is satisfied, the project technology
generates physical capital at the rate equal to R per unit of investment.  If the young agent runs
the project at the scale, it  1, the project revenue is Ritf(kt+1), only  fraction of which is
pledgeable to the creditor.  Thus, the borrowing constraint of each agent with z units of
endowment can be written as
(2) Ritf(kt+1)  rt+1(it  zW(kt)).   (it  1).30
In autarky, the domestic interest still adjusts so as to make the domestic investment equal
to the domestic saving, W(kt).  Thus, eq. (4) continues to govern the dynamics in autarky.
Consider now the small open economy case. If Rf(kt+1) > r, the profitability constraint is not
binding.  All the young agents are willing to invest as much as possible, which means that they
invest until they all face the binding borrowing constraint.  In other words, (2) holds with the
equality as long as it  1.  The investment by a young agent with z is thus equal to it(z) = 0 for z <
zt; and it(z) = z/zt for z  zt, for zt  [1 Rf(kt+1)/r]/W(kt).  The aggregate domestic investment
is hence equal to H(zt) 

t z t z dG z z ) ( ) / ( .  Thus, kt+1 is thus given by the unique solution of kt+1 =
RH(zt) where zt  [1 Rf(kt+1)/r]/W(kt), as long as it satisfies Rf(kt+1) > r.  By denoting this
unique solution by (kt; , R, r), the dynamics of the small open economy can expressed by,
(kt; , R, r) if kt < K(, R, r),
(6)k t+1 =
(r/R) if kt  K(, R, r),
where K(, R, r) is now defined uniquely by K that solves (r/R) = RH((1)/W(K)).
Again, Eq. (6) shares many common features with Eq. (6) and with Eq. (6).   For kt <
K(, R, r), Rf(kt+1) > r, so that the profitability constraint is not binding.  What determines the
domestic investment is the borrowing constraint, which is binding for all the agents. In this
range, the map is increasing in kt, R, and /r.  For kt  K(, R, r), Rf(kt+1) = r, so that the
profitability constraint determines the domestic investment.  In this range, the map is flat.  As in
Eq. (6), but unlike Eq. (6), the threshold level of kt below which the borrowing constraint
determines the domestic investment depends not only on  but also on R and r, and the map (6)
may have more than one stable intersection with the 45 line below K(, R, r).
As in subsection 7.1, the condition for the symmetry-breaking in the world economy is
equivalent to the condition under which the slope of the map (6) is less than one when evaluated
at the symmetric steady state, that is, at kt = K*(R) and r = r*, where r* is now given by the
unique solution to K*(R) = RH(z*), where z* = [1 Rf(K(R))/r*]/W(K*(R)).  As in subsection31
7.1, a complete characterization of asymmetric stable states is hopelessly complicated, because
there may be more than two stable steady states of the small open economy, which dramatically
increases the number of the types of the steady states for the world economy.
7.3.  Factor Market Integration
In this paper, it is assumed that physical capital is nontradeable, and that there is no
foreign direct investment (i.e., an agent can start an investment project only in his/her own
country).  What is essential is the presence of a home bias in the investment demand spillovers.
That is to say, a higher aggregate investment by the agents from one country increases the wealth
of the agents from the same country more than that of the agents from other countries.  Such a
home bias creates a larger credit multiplier within the same country than across countries.  As
long as some impediments to factor movements exist, a home bias arises naturally. Even if factor
movements are completely free, a home bias may still exist.  For example, the investment project
run by an agent from one country may create more demand for the endowment held by the
younger agents from the same country than the endowment held by the others, because of the
differences in languages, business cultures, etc.  In such a setting, a mechanism similar to those
discussed above could cause symmetry-breaking, even if all the factors and all the endowments
are costlessly tradeable.  Such alternative specifications, however, complicate the analysis
substantially, because a three-step analysis of autarky, small open economy, and the world
economy cases is possible only when the domestic investment does not change the value of the
endowment abroad.
Needless to say, a larger home bias would make symmetry-breaking more likely.
27  Thus,
one important implication of the symmetry-breaking mechanism based on credit market
imperfection is that the effects of globalization differ depending on whether it takes place in
financial markets or in factor markets.
7.4 Aggregate Increasing Returns and Agglomeration Economies
                                                                       
27In the limit, where all the home biases disappear completely, symmetry-breaking cannot occur.  However, in such a
perfectly integrated, frictionless world, the very notion of the “country” would lose its meaning.32
The previous studies on symmetry-breaking and endogenous inequality focused on the
mechanism driven by agglomeration economies based on increasing returns at the national levels.
In this paper, such aggregate increasing returns are deliberated excluded to highlight a symmetry-
breaking mechanism through credit market imperfection.  Combining these two mechanisms
would be simple.  For example, one could modify the technology of the final goods sector to Yt =
AtF(Kt, Lt), where At is the total factor productivity, which the competitive firms in the final
goods sector take as given, but increases with the aggregate level of capital stock as At = A(Kt).
This would not affect the key message of the paper; that is, with a greater credit market
imperfection, it is more likely that financial market globalization cause symmetry-breaking.
Needless to say, some results need to be modified.  First, symmetry-breaking may occur even if
the credit markets are perfect. See Krugman (1981) for such a model.  Second, it is possible that
all the countries may benefit from symmetry-breaking.  Thus, the countries that end up being
poor may be better off by financial market integration, even though they do not benefit as much
as rich countries.  Third, in the presence of strong agglomeration economies, symmetry-breaking
may by caused not only by financial market globalization but also by factor market globalization.
7.5 Infinitely Lived Agents
We use a finitely-lived overlapping generations (OG) model as a framework within which
to incorporate credit market imperfection.  This is because the OG model has a nice stability
property, which ensures that the cross-country differences disappear in the steady state in the
absence of credit market imperfection (under a simple condition; see (A2)).  On the other hand,
in the standard infinitely-lived representative agent (RA) model, the steady state imposes no
restriction on the cross-country distribution.
28 This “indeterminacy” property makes the RA
model inconvenient as a benchmark within which to evaluate the role of credit market
imperfection.  In addition, introducing credit market imperfection into the RA model would
make it subject to the multiplicity of equilibria based on self-fulfilling expectations, which would
further complicate the analysis.  It is thus not surprising that virtually anything could happen if
                                                                       
28See Becker (1980). See also Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000), which explore the dynamics of
distribution in the RA model.33
we would replace the OG model with the RA model. In particular, stable asymmetric steady
states often co-exist with stable symmetric steady state.
7.6  Exogenous Heterogeneity of Nations
The goal of this paper is to explain heterogeneity of nations, not to assume it.   Its basic
message is that even a small amount of exogenous heterogeneity can be amplified to create large
observed heterogeneity.  (Indeed, the analysis formally shows that zero exogenous heterogeneity
is needed to explain heterogeneity.)  Thus, introducing a small amount of exogenous
heterogeneity of nations in the model would not change this basic message. Of course, some
details of the analysis would have to change.  For example, without any exogenous heterogeneity,
a symmetry-breaking bifurcation would change the set of stable steady states from a unique one-
point distribution to multiple two-point distributions.  With a small exogenous heterogeneity, a
symmetry-breaking bifurcation would change it from a unique unimodal distribution to multiple
bimodal distributions.
8. Concluding Remarks
Globalization is a highly divisive issue and its proponents and opponents hardly
communicate with each other.
29  Globalization is also a multifaceted process.  The aim of this
paper is modest and limited.  It addresses only one aspect of globalization, the integration of
financial markets, and attempts to shed light by building a simple theoretical framework in an
attempt to reconcile the two views of the world.  The model is based on the standard neoclassical
overlapping generations model, modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection.  Within
this framework, the necessary and sufficient condition for symmetry-breaking was derived, i.e.,
the condition under which financial market globalization magnifies the inequality of nations.
This enables us to put some of the arguments made by the opponents of financial market
globalization under the logical scrutiny.  One major advantage of the model presented here is its
tractability.  It may be modified to address many issues in macroeconomics of credit market
imperfection.  See, for example, Matsuyama (2002b).
                                                                       
29See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Scott (2002), two recent articles in Foreign Affairs and a large
number of comments published in subsequent issues.34
Some limitations of the above analysis should be pointed out.  First, the effects of
financial market globalization were examined by comparing the two extreme cases, autarky and
full financial market integration. It would be more satisfactory to introduce some parameters
(say, financial transaction costs, the Tobin tax, etc.) that may be interpreted as a measure of
financial market globalization.  Second, the model assumes that globalization has no effect on the
degree of credit market imperfection. This assumption may be justified as a benchmark case,
because it is not obvious in which direction globalization might affect the operation of credit
markets.
30  Yet, the reader should keep in mind that the results of this paper are conditional on
this assumption.  Third, the model does not allow for sustainable growth of the world economy
as a whole. It would be interesting to examine the condition under which endogenous inequality
of nations occurs in a growing global economy. This would require the model to be extended in
such a way that the minimum investment requirement for the project would increase with the
growth of the world economy.  Fourth, the model has only one type of the capital good and one
final goods industry.  In a model with many capital goods or final goods industries, which differ
in the minimum investment requirements or in the default penalty, poor countries may find
comparative advantages in the sectors with less stringent borrowing constraints.  It would be
interesting to investigate how financial market globalization affects cross-country patterns of
development through its impacts on the industrial structures of the economies.
                                                                       
30On one hand, one might argue that, the lower the cost of international financial transactions is, it would be easier
for the borrowers to take the money and run, and it would be harder for the lenders to catch those who defaulted.  If
so, globalization has the effect of reducing the efficiency of credit markets.  On the other hand, one might also argue
that the globalization and resulting competition for the world saving provide a greater incentive for an individual
country to improve its corporate governance. If so, globalization may have the effect of enhancing the efficiency of
credit markets.  See Ando and Yanagawa (2002), who extended a small country version of the present model to
allow the local government to choose .  See, however, Tirole (2002b, Section 3.2, Application #4), who argues that
the government’s ability to choose  ex post could undermine the credit-worthiness of the domestic borrowers.35
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Figure 4: The Instability of the Symmetric Steady State when K*(Rc) < K*(R) < K()
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